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Abstract: I present an image of humanity as the will to power expressed in context of affirmation 
and danger in the eternal return. Nietzsche argues the death of God not as a theological 
argument but as an existential challenge for humanity to be re-experienced. It is read in light of 
the eternal return: without ontological references or quasi-transcendentals, how is life to be 
lived? Deleuze contextualizes Nietzsche’s critique of nihilism qua a typology of active and 
reactive modes of being, however I go beyond to provide what I consider an anthropological 
account. I do this by differentiating the will to power from individual willing and present the 
danger that an affirmation of life entails. Nietzsche challenges us with the eternal return. With 
this, one is led to realize that she is her own destruction (Untergehen) at the same time as her 
overture (Übergehen). She has the ability, power, capacity to overcome and self-create. With this 
realization one ought to remain truthful to this in form of truth-telling (Redlichkeit). Nietzsche 
projects humanity as a perilous crossing over from nihilism to affirmation with an embrace of 
an ethics of danger. This crossing over is a mark of life as the will to power. It is an overcoming 
of nihilism and the assurance amidst nihilism’s farce that the godhead is dead and that the 
eternal return is a daunting challenge we cannot escape from. With these, we are afforded an 
image of humanity as the will to power. 
Keywords: life-affirmation, eternal return, ethics of danger, will to power. 
 
In this essay, I present an image of humanity as the will to power expressed in context 
of affirmation and danger in the eternal return. My presentation takes great influence 
from Gilles Deleuze’s own reading of Nietzsche’s philosophy. Paolo Bolaños provides 
a useful commentary: «With Deleuze, Nietzsche’s ideas become alive» in that «they are 
put to use, thus restoring their very own philosophic dignity».1 Deleuze contextualizes 
Nietzsche’s critique of nihilism qua a typology of active and reactive modes of being, 
however what I do here is to go beyond Deleuze’s typological conception to provide 
what I consider an anthropological account. I do this by differentiating the will to power 
from individual willing and present the danger that an affirmation of life entails. 
«Modernity is losing, in addition to its feeling of vitality, the distinction between crisis 
 
1 Paolo A. BOLAÑOS, On Affirmation and Becoming: A Deleuzian Introduction to Nietzsche’s Ethics and Ontology, 
Cambridge Scholars, Newcastle upon Tyne 2014, p. 4. 
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and stability».2 Against the backdrop of the nihilistic culture’s decay and degeneration, 
Nietzsche supposes living dangerously as an expression of the will to power, accepting 
the perils of proclaiming the truth of God’s death, stemming not from reactivity but 
from affirmation and creativity. One suffers to further twine life, to further strengthen 
one’s will, to ultimately live life dangerously. To present how an image of Nietzsche’s 
view of humanity as the will to power, this essay is divided into five sections: 1) affect 
and the difference between a will and the will to power; 2) an image of freedom in 
humanity as both Übergang and Untergang through an analysis of a fragment (1885 
38[12]) of Nietzsche; 3) the ethics of danger and nihilism qua Sloterdijk’s enlightened 
false consciousness; 4) transition from becoming-affirmative to becoming-dangerous through 
Redlichkeit; and 5) life as a game constantly played. 
Nietzsche considers his philosophy as a form of psychology which roots out life’s 
decadent element as a widespread nihilism in that the sight of humanity makes us 
weary.3 This perpetuates as a state of weariness that banks on the emptiness of hope, 
the barrenness of life. I follow Kaityln Creasy in understanding nihilism from a 
psychological standpoint, «not merely the life-denying content of the nihilist’s claims, 
but also the psychophysiological basis of the nihilist’s negative evaluation of life».4 
Nietzsche explains that morality was previously an antidote to our distraught conditions 
yet eventually entailed life-negation that caused a psychophysiological futility.5 This 
affectivity of nihilism is profoundly personal for it is us who choose how to live life 
following the metaphysical bankruptcy of our idols penned by Nietzsche through God’s 
death.6 With Nietzsche’s declaration of God’s death, we are brought to see a perversion 
of the will – a lust for the same, a subscription to a pathological desire, and a reversal 
 
2 Peter SLOTERDIJK, Kritik der zynischen Vernunft, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1983, tr. 
Michael Eldred, Critique of Cynical Reason, University of Minneapolis Press, Minneapolis 1987, p. 124. 
3 Cfr. Jacob GOLOMB, Nietzsche’s “New Psychology”, in J. GOLOMB, W. SANTANIELLO, and R. LEHRER 
(eds.), Nietzsche and Depth Psychology, State University of New York, Albany 1999, p. 1 and Friedrich 
NIETZSCHE, Zur Genealogie der Moral, C. G. Naumann, Leipzig 1887, tr. Carol Diethe, The Genealogy of 
Morality, in K. ANSELL-PEARSON (ed.), The Genealogy of Morality and Other Writings, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2006, p. 25. 
4 Kaityln CREASY, On the Problem of Affective Nihilism, “The Journal of Nietzsche Studies”, 49, 1, 2018, 
p. 32. 
5 Cfr. Friedrich NIETZSCHE, Nachlass, tr. Kate Sturge, Writings from the Late Notebooks, Rüdiger Bittner 
(ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003, pp. 116-121 and Friedrich NIETZSCHE, Die 
fröhliche Wissenschaft, E. W. Fritzsch, Leipzig 1887, tr. Walter Kaufmann, The Gay Science. With a Prelude 
in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, Vintage Books, New York 1974, pp. 283-285. 
6 Cfr. NIETZSCHE, The Gay Science, p. 181. 
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of values.7 Plainly put, if God, religion, and truth no longer provide ontological 
foundations, then the main question is «Has existence any meaning at all?».8 He heralds the 
state of nihilism that deceives us of its passivity; we are brought to reckon our 
powerlessness in face of our dead idols. Nietzsche responds to this by supplying not an 
antidote but a challenge: 
What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness 
and say to you: “This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once 
more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain 
and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in 
your life will have to return to you, an in the same succession and sequence – even this 
spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The 
eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, 
speck of dust!” […]9 
Responding to nihilism, Nietzsche presents the eternal return not to offer consolation 
but to will not preservation but life’s overcoming.10 
Deleuze’s framework in reading Nietzsche consists of a typology of active or of 
reactive force, in Nietzschean terms as affirmative or reactive drive, emulated through 
the difference of the mythical masters and slaves.11 With this, he considers the eternal 
return as a practical rule of reason likened to Kant’s Categorical Imperative, «whatever 
you will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal return»;12 the first application as a 
rigorous challenge while it is secondly the implementation of an ethical thought. The 
eternal return for Deleuze is the return of difference for it is a selection of what is to 
return done by she in face of this ethical challenge. This commentary I opine is 
inadequate to conjure an anthropology for the tug between affirmation and negation 
does not constitute the human condition and to demand such from him is beyond the 
scope of his own philosophical project. I draw attention to fragment 8, notebook 38 of 
 
7 Cfr. CREASY, On the Problem of Affective Nihilism, p. 36, citing NIETZSCHE, The Genealogy of Morality, pp. 
87-92, 101-105, and Friedrich NIETZSCHE, Götzen-Dämmerung, C. G. Naumann, Leipzig 1889, tr. 
Judith Norman, Twilight of the Idols: Or, How to Philosophize with the Hammer, in A. RIDLEY and J. 
NORMAN (eds.), The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2005, p. 161. 
8 NIETZSCHE, The Gay Science, p. 308, and cfr. Keith ANSELL-PEARSON, An Introduction to Nietzsche as 
Political Thinker: The Perfect Nihilist, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994, p. 45. 
9 NIETZSCHE, The Gay Science, p. 273. 
10 Cfr. NIETZSCHE, Writings from the Late Notebooks, pp. 116-121 and ANSELL-PEARSON, An Introduction 
to Nietzsche as Political Thinker, pp. 49 and 109. 
11 Cfr. BOLAÑOS, On Affirmation and Becoming, pp. 15-23. 
12 Gilles DELEUZE, Nietzsche et la philosophie, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1962, tr. Hugh 
Tominson, Nietzsche and Philosophy, Continuum, London 1983, p. 68. 
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1885 where Nietzsche challenges our assumptions with an “I” behind every action. He 
admonishes us by saying that this “I” represents three distinct actions of willing, feeling, 
and thinking. He says, 
Every willing unites a multiplicity of feelings: Feeling, then, in fact many ways of feeling, 
must be recognised as an ingredient of the will, and so, secondly, must thinking. In every 
act of will, a thought commands – […] Thirdly, the will is not only a complex of feeling 
and thinking, but above all also an affect: that affect of command. What is called freedom 
of the will is essentially a feeling of superiority over the one who must obey[.]13 
Implicit in every will is thought and affect. This is something evident too in the 
presentation of the eternal return. Nietzsche is quite explicit with how pains, joys, 
thoughts, and sighs are to return. Nietzsche prizes feelings and affects.14 These 
neurophysiological changes are vital for confronting the return and the loneliest 
loneliness prefigures a negative response for the weak spirited: bearing the pain, the 
greatest weight, of loneliness, shame, guilt, regret numerable times again for eternity.15 
Nietzsche points to the primal fact of a confrontation within each person. The 
interbreeding among masters and slaves creates an admixture of drives within each 
person that creates contradicting typologies of active and reactive, of affirmation and 
negation.16 What remains for each is to overcome these different drives within, to 
channel one’s energies through a certain willing geared for life. The “I” therefore is 
nothing but another of our truths that we have forgotten are illusions for it stands in 
place of the competition of drives within, the attainment of a dominant perspective, 
one’s willing qua legislating, and its eventual enactment; a person who wills is one who 
feels and who thinks. Through her willing, she legislates and is free. She becomes, in 
Nietzsche’s playful thought, a god who knows how to dance—it is knowing how to 
 
13 Cfr. NIETZSCHE, Writings from the Late Notebooks, p. 36. Italics maintained. 
14 Although Nietzsche uses Gefühl and not Affekte, I follow Erika Kerruish in that Nietzsche uses «affect 
[affekte], passion [Leidenschaft, Passion] and feeling [Gefühl, Empfindung] interchangeably» (Erika 
KERRUISH, Interpreting Feeling: Nietzsche on the Emotions and the Self, “Minerva - An Internet Journal of 
Philosophy”, 13, 2009, p. 2, (accessed November 25th, 2020), 
http://www.minerva.mic.ul.ie/vol13/Nietzsche.pdf). 
15 Cfr. Justin REMHOF, Nietzsche on Loneliness, Self-Transformation, and the Eternal Recurrence, “The Journal 
of Nietzsche Studies”, 49, 2, 2018, pp. 196-197. 
16 Friedrich NIETZSCHE, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, C. G. Naumann, Leipzig 1886, tr. Judith Norman, 
Beyond Good and Evil, R.-P. Horstmann and J. Norman (eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2002, p. 87. 
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dance with different opponents, knowing how to handle contests. Willing is creating; 
willing is liberating.17 
This competition of the various drives ends with a feeling of power (Machtgefühl) when 
one is able to will (supposing her eventual enactment of this maxim). Nietzsche gives 
much emphasis to power for «There is nothing to life that has value except the degree 
of power – assuming, precisely, that life itself is the will to power».18 This conveys 
another important idea (that the world is the will to power) which I will return to in a 
later section, but for now what suffices is the understanding that power plays a crucial 
role in the confrontation of drives within. This feeling of power is an exercise of 
individual will in alignment to the will to power. We may therefore render the ethical 
challenge in a Kantian tone in another sense: «Act so as what you will increases power 
especially in its return».19 To differentiate the will to power from the activity of willing, 
we ought to remember that the will to power stands as our interpretative and evaluative 
tool as it is what propels us to confront and affirmatively select the return.20 The will to 
power is in fact the totality of wills insofar as oppositions create this advancement of 
power. It is the only ontological fact is life since it is the basis of moral valuations and a 
precondition for life’s expenditure through the will to power.21 In other words, the 
difference between individual willing and the will to power is that the former is our 
individual capacity or power (Leistung) while the latter serves as a backbone or, put 
explicitly, a metaphysical totality for «reality consists of contextual perspectives willing 
power».22 The notion of willing power though must not be reduced to domination. 
As long as the will to power is interpreted in terms of a “desire to dominate,” we inevitably 
make it depend on established values[…] We then cannot recognize the nature of the will 
to power as an elastic principle of all of our evaluations, as a hidden principle for the 
creation of new values not yet recognized. The will to power, says Nietzsche, consists not 
in coveting or even in taking but in creating and giving.23 
 
17 Cfr. Friedrich NIETZSCHE, Also Sprach Zarathustra, E. W. Schmeitzner, Chemnitz 1883, tr. Adrian 
Del Caro, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, A. Del Caro and R. B. Pippin (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2002, pp. 29, 65-67. 
18 NIETZSCHE, Writings from the Late Notebooks, pp. 119. 
19 Cfr. John RICHARDSON, Nietzsche’s System, Oxford University Press, New York 2002, p. 149. 
20 Cfr. DELEUZE, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 1. 
21 Cfr. BOLAÑOS, On Affirmation and Becoming, p. 12 and Gilles DELEUZE, L’Immanence: Une Vie, 
“Philosophie”, vol. 47, Editions de Minuit, Paris 1995, tr. Anne Boyman, Pure Immanence: Essays on A 
Life, MIT Press, New York 2001, p. 27. 
22 Cfr. RICHARDSON, Nietzsche’s System, p. 286. 
23 DELEUZE, Pure Immanence, p. 73. 
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Insofar as domination and destruction are present, willing turns perverted as it is 
dependent upon established values, failing to break free from the old metaphysics. 
Willing though becomes manifest of the will to power in supposing a vitality in creating 
and giving qua legislating for oneself not lording it over others. 
In this sense, we may view nihilism not as the bankruptcy of life but simply of one’s 
willing.24 It is not life that is nil but simply the reactivity, the failure of realizing one’s 
power (Leistung) for willing, or reducing power to simply domination. Nietzsche ramifies 
this in the Zur Genealogie der Moral for what made the masters superior – and he explicitly 
states this – is not their physical strength but their psychic determination. It was through 
a supremacy in their willing that «they were more complete people»25 This wholeness 
stresses that life is made complete by their type of willing and not the sheer act of willing. 
This psychic determination meant an adaptation of the will to power as a living organ 
rather than an ascendance to worldly or political power.26 What we may trace to the 
master ascendency is the capacity for emotive determinacy in face of trials as the will 
to power stood as their evaluative tool. Their willing was not directed to power but 
rather their willing was guided by that exact power qua evaluation of the will to power. 
Overcoming nihilism thus requires «a profound personal transformation, enacting 
fundamental changes in one’s constitution as a complex of drives» to recognize a 
peculiar harmony within.27 One needs a “naturalized” humanity to regain anew 
control of our moral judgements and to see life from this «most dangerous point of 
life[,]»28 a reminder of that parallelism that was forgotten in favor of a synthetic “I”. 
To confront this impoverishment of willing that nihilism expresses, Nietzsche 
supplies the eternal return to exacerbate it in hope of an immanent affirmation. I return 
to the passage I mentioned above (fragment 10, notebook 5, 1886-1887) that supposes 
the world as the will to power. Nietzsche reminds us this and says in Also Sprach 
Zarathustra to «remain faithful to the earth and do not believe those who speak to you 
of extraterrestrial hopes!»29 maintained in a fragment as, «This world is the will to 
power – and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power – and 
nothing besides!».30 In this (fragment 12, notebook 38, 1885), Nietzsche is radical 
 
24 This is contrary to Deleuze’s view expounded in DELEUZE, Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 147-148. 
25 NIETZSCHE, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 152. 
26 Cfr. ivi, pp. 152-153. 
27 CREASY, On the Problem of Affective Nihilism, p. 45. 
28 Cfr. NIETZSCHE, The Gay Science, pp. 167-169. 
29 NIETZSCHE, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 6. 
30 NIETZSCHE, Writings from the Late Notebooks, p. 39. 
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enough not simply for an epistemic revaluation but an ontological independence.31 
Realizing the twilight of one’s idols ought to create a dynamic overture in the 
individual.  
To stress this point, we can return to Nietzsche’s Also Sprach Zarathustra in which he 
says: «was geliebt werden kann am Menschen, das ist, dass er ein Übergang und ein 
Untergang ist».32 We may consider that what the greatest weight of the eternal return 
signifies is the tremendous capacity of being human as being one’s own Übergang and 
Untergang. Though translated literally as over-going and under-going, we better come 
to understand the human condition with the poetic presentations of overture and 
sunset. This shift in translation provides us a glimpse of the radicality of Nietzsche’s 
consideration. Among the translations, Kaufmann’s “overture” and Tille- and 
Appelbaum’s “transition” for Übergang while Tille’s “destruction” for Untergang exhibit 
my point.33 What can be loved in humanity is that it is its own transition and sunset, 
overture and destruction, a rope tied between animal and the Übermensch.34 Humanity 
is a going across, a crossing over. Übergang is literally above-going – going 
beyond/across or passing by or over – thus signifies a form of transition or migration, 
a crosswalk or checkpoint. Conversely, Untergang is under- or down-going that conveys 
destruction, decline, and ruin through the symbolism of the setting or sinking sun, the 
dusk that anticipates twilight. What is humanity? One’s own splendor and failure, one’s 
overcoming and destruction. 
This admixture of overture and destruction in the human person bears affinity with 
what Paolo Bolaños provides us of Deleuze’s reading by stressing the image of the world 
as chaosmos: «to stop thinking that chaos and cosmos are incompatible».35 Nietzsche 
chastises us and provides us a glimpse of the world. 
The total character of the world, however, is in all eternity chaos – in the sense not of a 
lack of necessity but of a lack of order […] Let us beware of attributing to it heartlessness 
and unreason or their opposites […] When will we complete our de-deification of nature? 
 
31 Cfr. Maudmarie CLARK and David DURKDICK, Nietzsche and Moral Objectivity: The Development of 
Nietzsche’s Metaethics, in M. CLARK, Nietzsche on Ethics and Politics, Oxford University Press, New York 
2015, p. 99. 
32 Friedrich NIETZSCHE, Also Sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen, Reclam, Stuttgart 1994, p. 
12. 
33 NIETZSCHE, Also Sprach Zarathustra, tr. Alexander Tille, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, T. Fisher Unwin, 
London 1908, tr. Walter Kaufmann, Penguin Books, Middlesex 1966, and tr. Stanley Appelbaum, 
Dover Publications, Mineola 2004. 
34 NIETZSCHE, tr. Adrian Del Caro, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 7-9. 
35 Cfr. BOLAÑOS, On Affirmation and Becoming, p. 61ff. 
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When may we begin to “naturalize” humanity in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly 
redeemed nature?36  
With this we are brought to see what I meant earlier by saying that it is not life that 
is nil but the reactive type of willing. Life comprises willing and everything outside, viz. 
the world. Willing vis-à-vis the chaos of the world provides an opportunity for us to de-
deify nature (our logical, anthropomorphic attributions) and naturalize our concept of 
humanity. An initial step towards this de-deification and naturalization is through re-
understanding life qua Lebensformen.37 These are the sensibilities we find ourselves in 
daily, our social, cultural, and physical conditions that intensify life’s most dangerous 
view. We become aware of our conditionality, our materiality. It is a mindfulness of the 
exact situations we find ourselves in as being our splendor and destruction – our ability 
and power to overcome and self-create at the same time as our failures and struggles. 
In context of Lebensformen, freedom arises through a recognition of the plurality of 
drives within and without for only through a confrontation of these drives is a creative 
element of legislating possible, not the reduction of chaos to order but the recognition 
of an immanence to chaos.38 As Nietzsche posits the absence of ontologically necessities 
(the idols we reified), he presents a horizon of freedom for us. This freedom though is 
not the absence of restrictions but is «measured by the resistance that needs to be 
overcome, by the effort that it costs to stay on top» for «the highest type of free human 
beings [is] where the highest resistance is constantly being overcome[.]».39 Nietzsche’s 
own qualification of freedom shows us that our horizons of freedom are the immediate 
boundaries that we seek to overcome, the daily problems we face, the struggles in 
almost all situations we confront. Nietzsche highlights struggles’ vitality in that this is 
necessary for freedom to be realized; the more pain is endured, the greater one’s auto-
plasticity becomes.  
Thus, considering Lebensformen from this vantage do we realize a parallelism of 
willing, feeling, and thinking, i.e. «a naturalized, de-moralized notion of freedom [that 
is] so radically different from metaphysical freedom».40 Nietzsche does not invoke 
freedom in a liberal sense, but the contrary since he likens liberalism and democracy to 
 
36 NIETZSCHE, The Gay Science, pp. 168-169. 
37 Richard SCHACHT, Nietzsche’s ,Naturalizing‘ Philosophical Anthropology, “Internationales Jahrbuch für 
philosophische Anthropologie”, 7, 2017, p. 58. 
38 Cfr. Razvan IOAN, Nietzsche’s Spinoza and Nietzsche on Freedom Empowerment and Affirmation, “European 
Journal of Philosophy”, 25, 4, 2017, p. 9, (accessed November 26th, 2020), 
https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12283. 
39 NIETZSCHE, Twilight of the Idols, pp. 212-213. 
40 Razvan IOAN, Nietzsche’s Spinoza and Nietzsche on Freedom Empowerment and Affirmation, p. 8. 
La Questione Filosofica – Heinrich Rennesland 
InCircolo n. 10 – Dicembre 2020  126 
the decadent condition.41 Freedom for him means not just the absence of any normative 
condition but of empty normative ones. One’s Lebensformen allow one to realize the 
immediate conditions to be overcome, to test the quality of one’s will in face of these, 
and to hopefully break free from the old metaphysics. It is the realization of power – 
not as domination but as interpretation and evaluation in form of a creative struggle. 
With the forgoing, we ought to confront how we should live. Nietzsche underscores 
that when the reigning morality is proved false, it becomes impossible to return to 
traditional virtue.42 Since this is improbable, what must be done according to him is a 
total revaluation of values. While reminiscing the greatness of antiquity, we must 
confront our present reactive scenario and make the best of it. We must strive to «grow 
more honest towards oneself».43 This type of honesty is Redlichkeit, a truth-speaking 
condition which «the process of becoming [is reflected in] Nietzsche’s affirmation of 
the pursuit of truth as an open experiment through which one simultaneously discovers 
and creates new forms of life».44 Nietzsche points to this particular dangerous way of 
living, for that childlike innocence to play the game of life anew. What I seek to bring 
to fore is what I borrow from Tobias Kuehne as Nietzsche’s ethics of danger. This type 
of danger is «the threat of unexpected decline, dissolution, or the destruction of a 
previously stable structure» especially in the face of «any reassuring worldview[.]».45 
Nietzsche’s declaration of God’s death shakes metaphysical stability. It challenges our 
long assumed ontological references or quasi-transcendentals. This conversely conveys 
the notion that every person’s life-journey is lived under constant threat that at any 
moment one’s values may suddenly decline or dissolve. It is a way of living to constantly 
challenge oneself to find better meaning for the present.  
The ethics of danger is a step forward from an ethics of affirmation for a dangerous 
mode of living is one which constantly tries to break free from nihilism and strives to 
be affirmative as opposed to what Deleuze would consider as the becoming-reactive of 
forces manifest of a nihilistic age.46 This reactivity may be better contextualized through 
Sloterdijk’s enlightened false consciousness which resounds life’s reduction to passivity. 
 
41 Cfr. NIETZSCHE, Twilight of the Idols, pp. 214-216. 
42 Friedrich NIETZSCHE, Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen, E. W. Fritzsch, Leipzig 1874, tr. R.J. Hollingdale, 
Untimely Meditations, D. Breazealy (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997, pp. 67-72. 
43 Friedrich NIETZSCHE, Morgenröte. Gedanken über die moralischen Vorurteile, E. Schmeitzner, Chemnitz 
1881, tr. R.J. Hollingdale, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, Maudemarie Clark and Brian 
Leiter (eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997, pp. 102-103. 
44 Vanessa LEMM, Truth, Embodiment, and Probity (Redlichkeit) in Nietzsche, in M. DRIES (ed.), Nietzsche on 
Consciousness and the Embodied Mind, de Gruyter, Berlin 2018, pp. 300-301. 
45 DELEUZE, Pure Immanence, pp. 80-81. 
46 Cfr. ivi, p. 75. 
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[The] psychic (seelisch) apparatus [of present-day cynics] has become elastic enough to 
incorporate as a survival factor a permanent doubt about their own activities. They know 
what they are doing, but they do it because, in the short run, the force of circumstances 
and the instinct for self-preservation are speaking the same language, and they are telling 
them that it has to be so.47 
Following Sloterdijk, we may read in Nietzsche’s eternal return a return of the 
cynical conditions of modern life. Though I wish not dwell here on Sloterdijk’s account 
of cynicism, what is thoughtful to consider is the ambivalence of our contemporary 
situation: We modern cynics work instinctively, not understanding existence between 
the value judgements of good-bad or even good-evil but as mere participation in 
collectivity, in herd-mentality. Bridging this to Nietzsche, we recognize how the masters 
acted because they knew they can, while interpreting this in today’s time would afford 
a strength in character stemming from a more resolved will. The reactivity of the slaves 
is gravely evident in a peculiar mode of non-thinking: «all thinking has become strategy; 
this impulse shows a disgust for a certain form of self-preservation».48 Whereas the 
masters’ good-bad was simply descriptive, the slaves’ good-evil was evaluative; to 
conjure this table of valuation makes one falsely enlightened and in the current age 
indeed reactivity’s triumph over activity. 
Confronting this contemporary condition means a confrontation of our very selves. 
Today’s enlightened false consciousness «has learned its lessons in enlightenment, but 
it has not, and probably was not able to, put them into practice. Well-off and miserable 
at the same time, [it] no longer feels affected by any critique of ideology; its falseness is 
already reflexively buffered».49 Nietzsche challenges the eternal return as a terrifying 
idea to shake us out of this melancholy that nihilism engulfs us in. One frets in face of 
life eternally returning because of the lack of a determined disposition to face life. 
However, the eternal return should rekindle not a telos of the Enlightenment, but a 
critical test of actual enlightenment.50 What is needed is a great transvaluation of values: 
«an active becoming of forces, a triumph of affirmation in the will to power»51 of having 
adapted this new metaphysical condition. 
From Deleuze’s reading, we get a disposition of becoming-affirmative in face of life as a 
transvaluation of values which is «the affirmative NO that paves the way for the 
relentless YES».52 In the eternal return, we open ourselves to danger for the demon 
 
47 SLOTERDIJK, Critique of Cynical Reason, p. 5. 
48 Ivi, p. xxix. 
49 Ivi, p. 5. 
50 Cfr. Andreas HUYSSEN, The Return of Diogenes as Postmodern Intellectual, forward to ivi, p. xvi. 
51 DELEUZE, Pure Immanence, 82. 
52 BOLAÑOS, On Affirmation and Becoming, p. 46. 
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chases us to our loneliest loneliness in which we are vulnerable «because we feel that 
something about our lives is missing or unfulfilled».53 Loneliness makes us recognize 
that we live our lives contrary to what we aspire for, how we have become reactive. 
The eternal return makes one vulnerable to the past – to the inability to change what 
has transpired – yet it also opens one to the future, of what one can do, of the things we 
must say NO to. It opens us to the possibility of changing ourselves in a radical sense: 
«So we are necessarily strangers to ourselves, we do not comprehend ourselves, we have 
to misunderstand ourselves».54 This type of painful strangeness is how I capture the 
radicality of Nietzsche’s ethical challenge. It is not simply about an ethics of affirmation 
but a realization of that primal immanence to life that conjures an implicit danger. 
From Deleuze’s becoming-affirmative, we ought to embrace a becoming-dangerous as a 
confrontation of our very selves and the eventual step of Redlichkeit. 
An ethics of danger thus builds upon an ethics of affirmation. This presupposes a 
strength in spirit reminiscent of the masters yet mindful of one’s insecurities and 
difficulties that stem from the reactive drive, «only those who have the courage, 
fortitude, and truthfulness to endanger themselves stand a chance of being ethical, 
while success in this endeavor is all but guaranteed».55 Dangers therefore accompany 
this in testing one’s strength of character to fully overcome nihilism and finding 
normative commitments to life after God’s death; for today, «self-preservation must be 
approached in the same language as those of self-destruction (Selbstvernichtung)».56 As the 
degree of life-negation increases, so too must one’s will to affirm life intensify. 
Nihilism represents a pathological transitional stage that offers an opportune 
moment to question one’s strength: «to have all the morbid traits of the century, but to 
balance them through a superabundant, recuperative strength».57 To confront the 
decadence of the current situation, one must have the strength to do so, one must be 
resolved to confront the loneliness that accompanies the revaluation. We have to 
experience the loneliness to confront the demon’s laughter; we have to experience the 
pain of a transvaluation to live in joy of life lived affirmatively. Nietzsche challenges us 
the eternal return with the hope of unleashing an extreme love for life in us – a great 
degree of resentment to a great degree of love. The «highest affirmation of the 
relationship of self and world involves the love of the fate of the world. Another way of 
putting this point is simply to say that amor fati represents our maximal possible feeling of 
 
53 REMHOF, Nietzsche on Loneliness, p. 195. 
54 NIETZSCHE, The Genealogy of Morality, p. 3. 
55 Tobias KUEHNE, Nietzsche’s Ethics of Danger, “The Journal of Nietzsche Studies”, 49, 1, 2018, p. 89. 
56 SLOTERDIJK, Critique of Cynical Reason, p. 8. 
57 NIETZSCHE, Writings from the Late Notebooks, pp. 74, 146-147. 
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power».58 The embrace of the entire world is freedom: it is the affirmation of the will 
to power, the maximization of Machtgefühl. This entails the selection of the return and 
an active remembrance to not repeat the same mistakes; not a toleration of wrongs 
done in society, but a mindfulness that they must not happen again. 
Nietzsche exacerbates nihilism with the eternal return for us to understand nihilistic 
distresses to transform ourselves.59 Humanity is the rope between ape and Übermensch, 
and Deleuze rightly concludes that in each exists a plurality of forces of both active and 
reactive.60 What makes a rope durable is the quality of the twine that I opine as the 
quality of love one has for fate, the continual testing of reactive forces – the plurality 
twines the rope on itself and fortifies it. With this strength of will, each person can 
conclude: «What doesn’t kill me makes me stronger».61 The greater the will, the greater 
the love the individual endures. Only by loving oneself, accepting all that one is, can 
overcoming even be possible. This is why amor fati must be read in conjunction with the 
eternal return. Nietzsche’s «formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one 
wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity».62 As 
Nietzsche depicts this love, we ought to infer not a love for one’s personal ambition but 
an embrace of his entirety – culture, history, and even humanity.63 It is a love of what 
happens, of what ought to happen to one’s life, culture, and society. In accepting 
conditions for living, one’s Lebensformen – especially through religion, culture, history – 
one gets a prized position and selects the return. It requires an intense amount of love 
to criticize what one loves (to realize our idols’ death). It requires an intense amount of 
love to point out the errors of the things one clings the most to. 
This challenge that Nietzsche presents to us is a view of what it means to be human. 
It is a challenge to become a child of second innocence and to love the world anew. 
Seeing the world afresh is similar to Zarathustra’s descent from the cave: dangerous. 
What makes Zarathustra’s journey peculiarly dangerous is the gift he brings humanity 
– Redlichkeit, truthfulness, probity. He reminds us that we have killed God and the 
revaluation has begun. This ought to awaken us from our epistemic slumber, to shackle 
 
58 Cfr. David OWEN, Nietzsche, Modernity, and Politics: A Critique of Liberal Reason, Sage Publications, 
London 1995, p. 110. 
59 Cfr. REMHOF, Nietzsche on Loneliness, p. 197. 
60 Cfr. DELEUZE, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 40. 
61 NIETZSCHE, Twilight of the Idols, p. 157. 
62 Friedrich NIETZSCHE, Ecce Homo, C. G. Naumann, Leipzig 1907,tr. Judith Norman, Ecce Homo, in 
A. RIDLEY and J. NORMAN (eds.), The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005, p. 99. 
63 Cfr. OWEN, Nietzsche, Modernity, and Politics, p. 110. 
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our reactive ontology, and to see the enormous possibilities of living dangerously.64 
One’s life-journey ought to be like Zarathustra’s – personal wandering replete with 
dangers.65 Speaking of truth in this context thus requires one to create: «To create is to 
lighten, to unburden life, to invent new possibilities of life. The creator is legislator – 
dancer».66 One tests the dangerous dance on the tightrope to traverse nihilism; one 
becomes affirmative in learning which ascetic ideals are in service to life-affirmation. 
One goes beyond the will to know and adapts the will to power; one learns through a 
certain discipline how to distinguish truth from untruth – and is not this what wisdom is? 
Loving wisdom is achieved by incorporating elements of one’s historicity to expand the 
economy of the soul.67 
A philosopher (lit. lover of wisdom) in this regard is the child after nihilism, i.e. 
«necessarily a person of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow».68 To qualify this, a 
philosopher in Nietzsche’s exact sense here means not just having a degree in the field, 
but rather she with a conscious decision to become affirmative. To differentiate thus, I 
maintain Nietzsche’s depiction of these freed individuals as “new” or “real” 
philosophers vis-à-vis “normal” philosophers. To be a real philosopher is not something 
taught but something experienced. These are the individuals who have learned  
to follow hunches, to think at a “presto” pace (VI:213), to embark on experiments both 
intellectual and existential (V:203, VI:211) to transform and to create values (V:205, 
VI:210), to put forward hypotheses that are risky: in short, to be interested in what he calls 
“dangerous perhapses” (I:2).69 
These philosophers of the future live with dangerous perhapses: perhaps truth is an 
illusion, perhaps life is to return, perhaps God is dead. Than a becoming-reactive because of 
these perhapses, the new philosopher sees these moments as immanent glimpses of 
affirmation and exposes herself to that constant struggle of breaking free from old 
metaphysics. 
Comparing the two types of philosophers, Nietzsche characterizes “normal” 
philosophers or in other instances “scholars” those who precisely fail to understand 
what it means to live dangerously, those who merely follow the necessities of dialectics 
or syllogisms.70 Those who have freed themselves from the shackles of a reactive 
 
64 Cfr. NIETZSCHE, The Gay Science, pp. 197-198 and 228-229. 
65 Cfr. KUEHNE, Nietzsche’s Ethics of Danger, p. 86. 
66 DELEUZE, Pure Immanence, p. 69. 
67 Cfr. CONWAY, Nietzsche and the Political, p. 69. 
68 NIETZSCHE, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 106. 
69 Rolf-Peter HORSTMANN, Introduction to ivi, p. xix. 
70 Cfr. ivi, pp. 107-108. 
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morality, who can face life dangerously, are the real philosophers, the real lovers of 
wisdom. They do not have the gravity of the spirit tied to necessities but knows how to 
live beyond the reactive valuation of good and evil. The ability of this new philosopher, 
the becoming-dangerous individual, is to legislate how to live her life after having 
ascertained that pain and joy are of the same coin. This is something entirely different 
from what the ascetic priests valued – a pathos than an ethos. Kaufmann supplies a brief 
understanding to this distinction: «Pathos is defined as “literally, the more transitory and 
passive experiences of life, as contrasted with ethos, the more permanent and active 
disposition and character”».71 The emphasis of the ascetic priests was the pathological 
element of life: life is transient and is directed towards the afterlife. A true philosopher 
breaks free from this decadence in morality and embraces the lightness of spirit, living 
affirmatively yet dangerously. 
Nietzsche wishes us to realize how the «ascetic ideal is a paradox».72 The Christian 
response is an ascetic practice of enduring suffering for the sake of an afterlife, which 
earns Nietzsche’s criticisms; the main issue at stake is how oblivious we are to the 
enormous reservoir of power the ascetic ideals have!73 We remember Nietzsche’s 
reverence for the ascetic ideals in so far as they are true.74 This shows their paradoxical 
character: on the one hand they make life bearable, yet on the other the endurability is 
for an afterlife. Becoming-dangerous is that disposition of the real philosopher to adopt 
good asceticism, i.e. ascetic practices that makes life bearable not through domination 
over others but through certain self-exercises. 
Good asceticism requires immense discipline and is an art in itself. It is a play, the 
eternal drama of the dice game and the affirmation of both chance and necessity when 
faced with the dice throw. The «Will to power depicts in dynamic and existential terms 
the idea that each affirmation is also a negation[.]».75 It is the affirmation of what falls 
to my lot and a negation of the possibility that I cheated by loading the dice. This willing 
manifests itself through divergences, variances, nuances – only through opposition does 
it surface; the will to power does not synthesize – it overcomes! It is necessary that 
something passes away and not merely is incorporated. There must be a downfall for 
an overture to appear. «[W]e ourselves, we free spirits, are nothing less than a “revalution 
of values”, an incarnate declaration of war and triumph over all the ancient conceptions 
 
71 James Mark BALDWIN, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, cited in NIETZSCHE, The Gay Science, 
note 43. 
72 OWEN, Nietzsche, Modernity, and Politics, p. 77. 
73 Cfr. NIETZSCHE, The Genealogy of Morality, pp. 109-110. 
74 Cfr. ivi, pp. 116-118. 
75 Lawrence J. HATAB, A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy: An Experiment to Postmodern Politics, Open Court 
Publishing, Illinois 1995, p. 8. 
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of “true” and “untrue”. […] We have learned to think differently».76 The freed spirits 
have relearned, have died to themselves yet was born anew. They have become 
recreations in themselves, “plays” with morality, tests to relearn the game and play it 
again. This can only happen through a childlike innocence after the whole process of 
revaluation, after confronting one’s loneliness and great suffering. This ought to be 
understood in the most radical sense: the creation of an entirely “new” second nature 
as a second naivete. This new nature allows us to recreate and to play the game of life 
again; we need to learn the rules afresh. This is the only way to recreate. This is the 
only way to play. «I do not know any other way of associating with great tasks than 
play: as a sign of greatness, this is an essential presupposition».77 The freed spirit 
legislates like a child. Her childlike innocence is necessary to play the game of life once 
more – as life is to return eternally. It is a radically fresh start to life. It is the importance of 
one’s innocence than one’s sin, of one’s capacity rather than one’s gravity.78 It is the 
beginning of a new game – do the dice fall to my favor? 
Humanity is a dangerous game of moral perfectionism. We need to constantly roll 
the dice but without loading them at the two dice throws as two moments of 
revaluation.79 Then again, midnight and noon, the two hours of revaluation, present 
us a game of chance, a game to affirm oneself, a game of danger. «It is Dionysus who 
throws the dice. It is he who dances and transforms himself, who is called “Polygethes”, 
the god of a thousand joys».80 Through the dice throws is one constantly born into joy, 
into innocence. It is Dionysus who overlooks this game and who promises that life «will 
eternally be reborn and come home out of destruction».81 Concerning this game, 
Zarathustra expresses his love for those who play fairly: «I love the one who is ashamed 
when the dice fall to his fortune and who then asks: am I a cheater? – For he wants to 
perish».82 This play entails me to affirm existence, not just the greatness of moments 
but even the most minute ones. This is to embrace our current capacity to love our fate 
and embrace the necessity of being but also of becoming. It is a game of chance, yet 
 
76 Friedrich NIETZSCHE, Der Antichrist, C. G. Naumann, Leipzig 1895, tr. Judith Norman, The 
Antichrist, in A. RIDLEY and J. NORMAN (eds.), The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other 
Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005, pp. 11-12. 
77 NIETZSCHE, Ecce Homo, p. 99. 
78 Cfr. NIETZSCHE, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, pp. 44-45. 
79 I differentiate here Zarathustra’s dice throw from that of the Scholars who embrace the virtues that 
make small, that pontificate these virtues on others (Cfr. NIETZSCHE, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 97-
99). Cfr. DELEUZE, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 25. 
80 Ivi, p. 18. 
81 NIETZSCHE, Writings from the Late Notebooks, p. 249. 
82 NIETZSCHE, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 7-9. 
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the child is surprised upon receiving her lot while the scholars are surprised if they do 
not receive theirs. 
This game forms the good asceticism that a true philosopher engages in. Lawrence 
Hatab reminds us that «the higher types of creative individuals are those who serve and 
enact the process of “aesthetic” forming that gives humanity its meanings, purposes, 
values, and truths».83 Nietzsche’s presentation of an ethos is holistic without any divide 
between thinking and acting: «Once I have said I will do a thing, I do it».84 The 
epistemic-ethical gap between thoughts and actions is overcome for one’s great love 
(for oneself) bridges this gap: “I want to live a life that is to return. I therefore should 
live a life I desire”. This type of truth-telling is fundamental to living a life of affirmation, 
but even further, a life of danger. It is a humanity lying open to the dangerous 
realization that my life’s successes and failures are solely based on how I choose to 
approach life. Nietzsche’s prescription is an ascetic practice of denying the No- and 
affirming the Yes-saying principle. It is the danger of treading intellectual honesty and 
truth-telling, and the constant re-appropriation of self-directing principles. It is a 
dynamicity within to overcome the tensions and conflicts of the spirit. It further 
strengthens the twine. 
Finally, through this ethos do we observe the dynamic recreation of the freed spirit. 
With one eye to the future, one endures suffering not for the sake of a better tomorrow 
but because of love. It is a dynamic overcoming of one’s condition, the godlike feeling 
of humaneness.85 We have to remember we are products of our own historicity. This is 
the reason why nihilism ought to be exacerbated for a new way of living «can only 
emerge in the new ways of seeing and feeling that come from thinking through the old 
ideal and its role in making us who we are now».86 Breaking off from the former into a 
recreation of the spirit; for only at the breaking of twilight does the owl of Minerva take 
its flight, does philosophy makes sense, that the Athenian tetradrachm flips. Taking our 
historicity into consideration, self-overcoming «exploits the plasticity of the human soul 
to engender internal difference and variegation. The greater the distances created 
within the soul, the greater the range of perspectives the real philosopher can entertain 
and command».87 The lover of life, the true philosopher, the freed spirit, achieves this 
paramount purview of existence through her recreation. It becomes a pinnacle or 
 
83 HATAB, A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy, p. 9. 
84 NIETZSCHE, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, p. 304. 
85 Cfr. NIETZSCHE, The Gay Science, pp. 267-269. 
86 Maudemarie CLARK, Nietzsche on Ethics and Politics, Oxford University Press, New York 2015, p. 73. 
87 CONWAY, Nietzsche and the Political, p. 69. 
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(un)reason; I need to reeducate myself and relearn higher ideals, to love myself even 
more, for even love has to be learned.88 
* * * 
Nietzsche aids his presentation of the idols’ twilight with the eternal return as the 
extreme form of nihilism. In face of widespread nihilism, we are left to consider what it 
means to be human. Nietzsche’s response to this is not a form of moderation but its 
exacerbation. He challenges the eternal return to elicit from his readers a particular 
way of living – only if the spirit is strong enough to endure such suffering then a new 
image of humanity ensues. If life is to eternally return, then one is left to choose how 
she wishes to live. Envisioning humanity is a primal recognition of one’s capacity for 
affirmation, but even greater of opening oneself to danger. Through an ontological 
restructuring by realizing the will to power does this challenge reveal what a new 
humanity means: I play the game anew; I learn the rules again. Both chance and 
necessity present themselves as constitutive elements of playing. In face of the crudest 
form of nihilism, one confronts oneself and makes the decision: Am I willing to play 
this game again? Am I willing to lose? To win? What am I willing to give up to play 
again if it is to return? Lastly, if the eternal return is indeed to be taken seriously, one 
ought to become someone entirely new. The game is the same but entirely new; 
humanity is the same but entirely new. 
Thus, living life from this vantage point effects an ethics of danger, a wary approach 
to nihilism and a fervent desire to become affirmative. One needs to be open to affirm 
but also to open herself to the danger this presents. To be open to the dangers that this 
lays out for me is not something I shy away from but should accept fully – after all, we 
get our complete bliss when we are in most danger.89 I must remain faithful to the earth, 
faithful to myself – faithful to the will to power. In this sense, humanity becomes a lover 
of wisdom, a truth-teller of the need to remain faithful to the will to power. Due to the 
presence of multiple forces within each person, it is clear that no one is consistently 
affirmative or reactive. To overcome this struggle, one recognizes the antagonism 
within that is triumphed by the affirmative force, manifested externally as a “No” to 
the nihilistic triad. Overcoming nihilism by becoming-dangerous ought to be a constant 
disposition, and such makes one a true philosopher, living dangerous due to the ‘truth-
speaking’ capacity to proclaim the revaluation of values. The freed spirit in this case 
has the «mature freedom of spirit which is equally self-mastery and discipline of the 
 
88 Cfr. NIETZSCHE, The Gay Science, p. 262. 
89 Cfr. NIETZSCHE, Beyond Good and Evil, pp. 114-116. 
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heart and permits access to many and contradictory modes of thought».90 Living with 
these new values of becoming-affirmative and Redlichkeit is what an ethics of danger means, 
what humanity as the will to power signifies. 
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